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I. Introduction
A. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Concerns with Technology
In modern American society, although privacy rights are undeniable, advancements in
technology are inevitable. Technology‟s encroachment upon privacy interests and rights is on the
horizon, if not underway already. In America, the history of privacy rights dates back to the Bill
of Rights, specifically the Fourth Amendment‟s guarantee that:
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”1
Privacy rights predate the founding fathers and have established roots in English legal doctrine.
As early as the 16th century, Sir Edward Coke wrote: "The house of every one is to him as his
castle and fortress, as well for his defence [sic] against injury and violence as for his repose." 2
Thus, even before the founding fathers drafted the Fourth Amendment, privacy was a cherished
and established right. Although this passage refers to the home, the Fourth Amendment, as
ratified in 1791, expanded the right of privacy to persons, papers, and effects.3 Modern
technological advances present novel risks of government intrusion upon personal privacy
interests.

1

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2

The privacy rights at issue in this comment concern not only the contexts of smartphones
and tablets, but also those relating to Global Positioning Systems (“GPS”), tracking devices and
other enhanced surveillance capabilities utilized by government officials. While these two areas
may appear facially distinct, both share two fundamental qualities – possessory interests in
property and a reasonable expectation of privacy by its user against governmental invasion. The
Supreme Court has held that ownership interests include the right to be let alone from unwanted
interference.4 Additionally, Black’s Law Dictionary defines possessory interests as “the right to
control property, including the right to exclude others.” If ownership interests include the ability
to exclude others, and possessory interests include the right to control property and exclude
others from trespassing upon that property, and if these technological devices are considered
property, then do they not deserve the same protection under the Fourth Amendment as other
“effects”? If this contention is logical, and precedence is followed from previous holdings, then a
person‟s technological property deserves this protection that is conveyed upon “effects” under
the Fourth Amendment.
First, the wave of rapid technological advancement among home computers, tablet
computers, laptops, and smartphones has greatly blurred the distinction between computer and
cellphone. Additionally, enhanced surveillance techniques through the use of GPS tracking are
greatly facilitated by the recent developments in such technology. Government officials now
have the ability to monitor the movement of persons not only within public areas, but even
within the private confines of their homes as well. While such innovations have produced a
generally positive effect in modern society, it has come at the price of privacy. Consequently, the
4

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). The power to
exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle
of property rights.

2

legal system has been presented with a litany of novel and complex issues. This article focuses
upon how the courts have attempted to adapt to and evaluate the continuing progression of
technology in light of its potential infringement on constitutional rights.
II. Historical Background
A. Privacy Issues Involving Smartphones, GPS and Other Enhanced Surveillance
As smartphones are a relatively recent technological innovation, privacy concerns in this
area have a limited history of jurisprudence. The best way to consider these devices is to assess
the development of telephones, cellphones, and smartphones from one side, and the development
of computers, laptops, and smartphones from the other. Smartphones blend telephone and
computer technologies into a mobile, virtually autonomous device that travels on the person.
The drastic increase in technological capability has caused great difficulty in determining
what constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.5 Subsequent caselaw
has questioned what is considered a search, 6 what constitutes a “reasonable” expectation of
privacy, 7 and also evaluated novel technologies while struggling to deal with the issue of how
government officials can, without a warrant, utilize new technology without violating the Fourth
Amendment.8 With the rise of technology and its ability to gather and monitor citizens in public

5

See United States v. Garcia, 474 F. 3d 994 (2007).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (open field not considered curtilage); United
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1120 (1999) (beeper attachment not considered “search”). But
see United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 671
(2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), aff'd in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945 (2012) (GPS was considered a “search” because of the scope of the data collected
habits of the persons, not just one point in time. Legislature has prohibited the use of this from
citizens, thus society deems this as a reasonable expectation of privacy).
7
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967). The Fourth Amendment protects the
reasonable expectation to privacy for acts that are subjectively considered private.
8
Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
6
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places and even in a person‟s home, the question as to what constitutes a search is still an
uncertain science.9
Over forty years ago, in United States v. Magana, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence
gathered by police in a private driveway is admissible. 10Magana allowed this gathering of
evidence, without a warrant, on private property11 on the grounds that the driveway was only a
“semi-private” area despite being within the curtilage of Magana‟s home. 12 Magana set
potentially dangerous precedent that the driveway, and thus the curtilage of a citizen‟s home, is
only a semi-private area with a reduced expectation of privacy. 13 The Supreme Court took what
some would consider an equally dangerous step in United States v. Knotts by concluding that
technology only acts to enhance the senses of government officials, and therefore an evaluation
of whether a search occurred is not a question of type, but more aptly defined as a question of
scope.14 Knotts provided the courts with one of the first intersections of technology and law with
respect to monitoring a person‟s movements on public roads.15 Ultimately, Knotts perhaps
presented one of earliest examples of technology‟s victory over the Fourth Amendment.16

9

Eventually the courts will have to answer the question presented in the argument as to what
constitutes as a search in public, given the scope and breadth of the searching and tracking
capabilities of new technology.
10
United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975).
11
Id. at 1170.
12
Id. at 1171.
13
Id. The expectation of privacy largely depends on the nature of the activities being performed
and the visibility of those activities from public property. Thus, the court concluded that because
Magana was openly engaged in an activity that could be seen from the street, he could not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway.
14
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
15
Id. at 285. The issue decided is whether the use of a beeper to monitor the progress of
defendant‟s car violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant.
16
Id. No constitutional issues are raised when government agents use scientific enhancement of
this sort. The reasoning is validated by the stance that a police car following defendant could
have observed defendant travelling on the public highways and arriving at the location of the
4

The Supreme Court decided Oliver v. United States nearly a decade later, holding that
open fields were not considered part of the curtilage afforded protection under the Fourth
Amendment.17 In Oliver, agents gathered evidence by walking around a gated road, disregarding
a posted “No Trespassing” sign, and entered a suspect‟s private land. 18 The Court rested its
rationale on how the open fields doctrine interacts with the Fourth Amendment and how this
affects the reasonable expectation of privacy. 19 In holding that no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred, the majority found no significant societal interest in protecting open fields, relative to
the protection one‟s home.20 However, the Oliver decision did not come without contest, as
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Stevens all dissented on the grounds that private land marked by
the owner in a fashion prohibiting entry by others should require a warrant or probable cause and
should be afforded the full protections granted by the Fourth Amendment. 21
In United States v. Dunn, the Supreme Court set forth a four-factor test for courts to apply
when determining whether curtilage is protected.22 The Court identified the four factors as: the

arrest. Thus, the court reasons that the increase in technology only broadens the scope of what
police are able to do, but does not constitute a new “type” of search.
17
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
18
Id.
19
Id. at 179. Open fields do not constitute a proper setting for intimate activities that the Fourth
Amendment is intended to protect from unwarranted government intrusion. In addition, there is
no societal interest in protecting open fields, as there is at a home, commercial building, or
office. Society does not recognize an expectation of privacy in open fields as reasonable.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 194-95. The line of reasoning that real property is not included in the list of protected
areas under the Fourth Amendment is both inconsistent with previous decisions, of which the
Court did not seek to overrule. In addition, the Court‟s reading of the actual language of the text
of the Fourth Amendment is logically flawed because the court fails to explain why curtilage
cannot constitute a field. The arbitrary self-fulfilling definition of curtilage seems to be applied
when beneficial in the justification of the Court‟s decision.
22
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Curtilage questions should be resolved with
particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to
5

proximity of the area to the home, whether the area is within an enclosure surrounding the home,
the nature of the use of the area, and steps taken to protect the area from outside observation. 23
The Court also elaborated on the concept of curtilage, which originated at common law, as the
area immediately surrounding the home. 24 The central component of his inquiry was to protect
the sanctity of the person‟s home and ensure privacy in this area. 25 This four-factor test issued
guidance as to how police could approach a resident‟s home, and was specifically applied in
California v. Ciraolo.26 In evaluating whether police taking pictures of marijuana while flying
over Ciraolo‟s back yard in an airplane was permissible, 27 the Court asked the question which
serves as the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment: whether a person has a “constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy.” 28 In finding no constitutional violation despite the
fact that Ciraolo erected a ten-foot fence around his yard, the Court held that Ciraolo‟s
expectation of privacy was unreasonable. 29 It found that the society does not recognize or honor
this subjective expectation of privacy because airplanes can legally fly over Ciraolo‟s backyard
and anything therein would be visible to passengers. 30

which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
onlookers.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 300 (“The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately
surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the
house itself.”).
25
Id.
26
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986).
27
Id. Aerial observation of the premises at an altitude of 1000 feet was used to determine
marijuana detection.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 215.
6

This analysis became known as the plain view doctrine and was later followed by the
Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,31 but the problem herein is that at some point in
time, all evidence gathered by government officials will be in plain view due to technological
advancements. Thus, determining what steps were taken in order to place the evidence within
plain view is the preliminary determination to make when considering whether evidence
obtained is within the plain view warrant exception. Following this rationale set forth in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, with respect to warrantless searches of smartphones and tablets, the
plain view warrant exception should apply when government officials see information contained
on an electronic device without taking any additional steps. If additional steps are taken in order
to place the evidence in plain view, then by definition the evidence is not in plain view.
It could reasonably be argued that government officials may see a smartphone or tablet
within plain view while making a legal arrest. However, it is also reasonable to infer that beyond
finding the device itself, the information contained inside is not in plain view, but rather
additional steps must be taken to access the information. A warrant should then be required for
the police to further examine the device. Simply put, accessing the information contained within
a smartphone or tablet should require further authorization even when the device itself is in plain
view. This authorization should be issued by a neutral magistrate – not at the discretion of the
police. Establishing a warrant requirement to access information inside any electronic device,
irrespective of whether the device is in plain view or not, benefits both law enforcement as well

31

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well established that under
certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant. But it is
important to note that in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in
plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with the „plain view‟ doctrine has
been in identifying the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance rather than being
simply the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal.”).
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as citizens by creating a bright-line rule for government officials to follow and ensuring Fourth
Amendment privacy rights are better respected.
III. Current Cases and State of the Law
A. Current State of the Law for Smartphones
In Smallwood v. State, the Florida District Court of Appeals ruled that a government
official was allowed to search a phone for the call history, text messages, photos, emails and
other content without a warrant.32 The police, conducting a search incident to arrest, had no
reason to suspect the phone contained any evidence pertaining to the arrest itself. 33 Normally,
however, a warrant exception via a search incident to lawful arrest is only valid when an officer
makes an arrest and searches the areas on the person or within the person‟s reach for weapons
that may be used to effectuate the person‟s escape. 34 The officer may also search such areas in
order to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. 35 If one of these conditions is met,
the warrant exception applies and generally all inculpatory evidence found may be admitted. 36
However, this exception to the warrant requirement does not justify general searches in other
areas including rooms, furniture, and other closed areas. 37

32

Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448, 459 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 68 So. 3d
235 (Fla. 2011).
33
Id.
34
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for
the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter
might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction.”).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
8

The Smallwood court seemed aware of precedent holding that information contained
within electronic devices is distinct from information contained in an actual box. 38 It also was
aware that this precedent it relied upon not only had the potential to already be outdated, but
could also be difficult to apply to smartphone searches. 39 The court cited State v. Smith, holding
that a cell phone is not a “container” and that a cell phone may never be searched under the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.40 The reasoning was that there
was a great personal privacy interest in the personal data contained within smartphones. 41 In
addition, the Smith court held the exigent circumstances doctrine was inapplicable when seeking
to search cell phones because there is not a particular issue of safety for the officers and any
evidence that may be destroyed can be recovered. 42 Exigent circumstances allow for warrantless
searches, but require an objectively compelling reason to do so,43 which was not at issue in
Smallwood. Still, the Smallwood court held that Smith, although on point, contravened with the
United States Supreme Court precedent set forth in United States v. Robinson, a case validating
the warrantless search under the exigent circumstances doctrine. 44 Robinson held that closed

38

State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009).
Smallwood v. State, 61 So. 3d 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 68 So. 3d 235
(Fla. 2011).
40
Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 955.
43
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“Warrants are generally required to
search a person's home or his person unless „the exigencies of the situation‟ make the needs of
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.”).
44
See Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 448 (“We are, however, constrained to affirm the denial of the
motion to suppress based on article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, which mandates we
follow United States Supreme Court precedent in the area of search and seizure. Therefore, we
are bound by the Supreme Court's decision of United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234
(1973), in which the Court held containers found upon a person incident to arrest may be
searched without „additional justification.‟ We are not unmindful, however, of the unique
qualities of a cell phone which, like a computer, may contain a large amount of sensitive
39

9

containers can be reasonably searched pursuant to a valid arrest.45 Per the Florida Constitution,
the Smallwood court was bound by United States Supreme Court, and subsequently found the
cell phone data evidence obtained by the government officials to be admissible. 46
The Smallwood court opined that precedent was indeed binding, but that it was misguided
and inapplicable to smartphone and tablet technologies. 47 The court admitted, however, that there
is a fundamental difference between technology and closed containers. 48 As such, there should
be separate test that recognizes this fundamental difference, one that more accurately affords the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 49 Both Smallwood and Smith explicitly admitted that
capabilities of modern smartphones are less analogous to closed containers, and instead more
properly equivalent to computers.50
The United States Supreme Court has longstanding precedence supporting the notion that
the Fourth Amendment‟s right to privacy applies to government invasions not just of the home,

personal information. We, therefore, also certify a question of great public importance
concerning whether the general rules announced in Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, regarding searches
incident to arrest are applicable to information contained on a cell phone held on an arrestee's
person.”).
45
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
46
Smallwood, 61 So. 3d at 459 (“Smith is clearly directly on point as is its reasoning that a cell
phone is not a “container” pursuant to Belton. However, Smith's finding that a cell phone may
never be searched under the search incident to arrest warrant requirement appears to contravene
existing United States Supreme Court case law, which has never made any type of evidence
found on or within the reach of an arrestee entirely off limits during such a search, not even a
car. Article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution provides the right against unreasonable
search and seizure as granted under the Florida Constitution “shall be construed in conformity
with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court. Therefore, this court is bound by the United States Supreme Court precedent.”).
47
See id. at 448 (arguing that the court should follow the United States Supreme Court precedent
in the area of search and seizure pursuant the Florida State Constitution requirement).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
10

but also to persons.51 In 1886, however, courts presumably did not foresee the advancement into
the internet age and of modern technology. The question then becomes, assuming lower courts
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions follow precedent, is following this jurisprudence a wise
choice given the advancement in these types of technologies? It is questionable whether
decisions made even five years ago could fully comprehend the types of technological
capabilities used in modern society, much less twenty-five years into the future or more. As such,
should the Supreme Court make the next decision considering the warrantless search of a
smartphone or tablet one of first impression?
Modern technology now blurs what was once a routine search of a person and their
belongings by adding the capability to carry virtually unlimited amounts of highly personal and
private information. This information pertains to, but is not limited to financial records, political
views, religious beliefs, valuable intellectual property ideas, personal pictures, personal
communications and classified professional data. It is reasonable to believe that the degrees and
kinds of information carried on modern smartphones and tablets falls well outside the scope or
need of many routine police searches. As a result, there should be required a minimum standard
of reasonable suspicion or a warrant in order for government officials to search these devices.
The rate and progression with which technology is advancing makes the distinctions in
technology not only one of degree and breadth, but of fundamental differences in type of
information. The amount of information traditionally carried in tangible objects has little relation

51

See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 617, 630 (1886) (arguing the Fourth Amendment
principles “apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity
of a man‟s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging
of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property . . . the invasion of this sacred
right which underlies . . . the essence.”).
11

to the types of data contained in rapidly evolving technological devices.52 In effect, smartphones
and tablets are creating not only a new way to communicate, but a new type of communication
altogether.53 This new technological type of information is unique and not similar to the amounts
and degrees of information of previous generations; thus, the applicable standard governing these
new types of information should also be unique.
Given current technological capabilities, mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets
contain information documenting potentially every aspect of a person‟s life, while both at home
and away. From bank records to birthdays, social security numbers to passwords, these devices
have the capability to reveal a person‟s most sensitive, personal and critical data. Routine
searches, such as a pat down, luggage check or asking a traveler to take off their shoes, reveals
minimum details about the traveler, while a search of a laptop or other electronic device may
reveal a person's entire life or career.54 Consequently, the search of a modern technological
device could reveal as much, if not more, information as would a search of one‟s entire home. As
52

For example, if police find a bag of marijuana on a suspect, it is merely a bag of marijuana. If
the marijuana is inspected further, no additional information can truly be obtained – a visual
inspection of just the item itself is sufficient to obtain all the necessary information about the
object. While it is true that the marijuana can be inspected in a laboratory to determine its
chemical makeup, it is still merely marijuana. Conversely, a cell phone or computer provides a
different type of information altogether. If inspected, it is still merely a computer. Even if broken
down into its smaller parts like a hard drive or motherboard, no information other than that
relating to the computer or cell phone itself is obtained. The information stored inside the object
does not pertain to what makes a cell phone a cell phone or a computer a computer; instead, it is
entirely separate, unrelated information. Additionally, the amount of information available is
almost beyond comparison. This comment, as written in Microsoft Word, is approximately 100
kilobytes and 33 pages worth of text. An Apple iPhone carries up to 64 gigabytes (67,108,864
kilobytes) worth of storage. Thus, 671,088 copies of this comment totaling over 22 million pages
of text could fit on a very popular cell phone. It should be noted that this is uncompressed data –
if compressed, such numbers could be significantly increased (all numbers are approximate).
53
See Joshua A. Engel, Doctrinal Collapse: Smart Phones Cause Courts to Reconsider Fourth
Amendment Searches of Electronic Devices, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 233, 289 (2010).
54
See Joelle Hoffman, Reasonable Suspicion Should Be Required at a Minimum for Customs
Officials to Execute a Search of a Laptop at U.S. Borders: Why U.S. v. Arnold Got It Wrong, 36
W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 181 (2009).
12

the search of a person‟s laptop, tablet, smartphone, or other electronic equivalent is not routine
and is typically unnecessary, reasonable suspicion related to the kinds of highly private
information contained within the device should be a minimum requirement for allowing a search.
An obvious distinction is the border exception, which allows for greater protection of the
sovereign at international borders, based on the public interest of safety.55 However, the
reasoning behind requiring reasonable suspicion is still applicable to the search of smartphones
and tablets within the border.56 Simply put, the information contained therein is too sensitive to
not provide a protection against arbitrary searches.
In the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Arnold, the defendant argued that there is a
fundamental distinction between laptops and closed containers.57 Arnold further contended that
laptops are more reasonably equated to homes and the human mind than to a restrictive closed
container because of the types and amount of information contained therein. 58 Arnold's analogy
of a laptop to a home is based on the notion that a laptop's capacity allows for the storage of
personal documents in an amount equivalent to that stored in one's home.59 As a result, Arnold
argued that a laptop is akin to the human mind because of its ability to record ideas, e-mail,
internet chats and web-surfing habits.60 If we, as a society, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in our homes, it is inarguable that we also expect to have a reasonable expectation in our

55

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Consistently, therefore,
with Congress' power to protect the Nation by stopping and examining persons entering this
country, the Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the
international border than in the interior. Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants
are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.”).
56
Id.
57
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d.1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2008).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
13

mind. In the sense that technology is able to record and partially analyze our thoughts and habits,
it is reasonable that as a society, we expect this to be protected by our Constitution as well.
In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, the dissent correctly interpreted the Fourth
Amendment and noted the effect that intrusions upon individual rights have on persons and
society as a whole. 61 In apparent opposition to the majority, the dissent contended that Fourth
Amendment rights are “not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in inhibiting the public, crushing
the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is
one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” 62 The
threat of suspicionless, warrantless, non-routine governmental searches and seizures would have
an animus, chilling effect on the public at large and violates the rights established and protected
by the Fourth Amendment. In light of this, the Smith Court acknowledged that legitimate
concerns exist regarding the effect of allowing warrantless searches of smartphones. 63 It noted
that as modern technologies allow for high-speed internet access and are capable of storing
tremendous amounts of private data, warrantless searches of such devices pose a particularly
significant threat to privacy rights. 64
The constitutional right to the expectation of privacy should not be retracted or
diminished with respect to the use of technologically enhanced electronic devices. As Justice
Harlan emphatically stated in Katz v. United States, “the relevant inquiry under the Fourth

61

Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 598 (“Today, for the first time in the nearly 200-year history
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court approves a completely unwarranted seizure and detention of
persons and an entry onto private, noncommercial premises by police officers, without any
limitations whatever on the officers' discretion or any safeguards against abuse.”).
62
Id.
63
State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 168, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (2009).
64
Id.
14

Amendment has two parts: first, whether the person had “an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy,” and second, whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is “one that
society is prepared to recognize as „reasonable.” 65 As few people openly broadcast all their
phone calls, text messages, and personal information stored within their devices to the public,
people have an actual expectation of privacy with these devices, as well as an expectation that
society, based on the breadth or persons using these devices, is prepared to see as reasonable.
In the earlier-mentioned case of United States v. Arnold, the Ninth Circuit overturned a
lower court‟s granting of a motion to suppress the evidence gathered during the search of
Arnold‟s electronic content on his laptop due to a lack of reasonable suspicion – typically a
necessary prerequisite for such a search. 66 In Arnold, government agents at an international
border checkpoint, without reasonable suspicion, accessed two icons, opened two separate files
containing photographs, and viewed other files on the laptop‟s hard drive that ultimately led to
evidence introduced to support the government‟s case in chief. 67 Arnold subsequently filed a
motion to suppress, arguing that the government conducted the search without reasonable
suspicion and thus violated his Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 68 The Ninth Circuit was not
persuaded, however, as it questionably declared that “in any event, the district court‟s holding
that particularized suspicion is required to search a laptop, based on cases involving the search of
the person, was erroneous.”69 Where the Ninth Circuit errs is by trying to evaluate a laptop and
person under the same Fourth Amendment analysis. The proper analysis is to evaluate whether a
laptop is an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding the border

65

See Engel, supra note 53, at 238.
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d.1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
67
Id. at 1005.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1008.
66

15

exception which is applicable in Arnold,70 when analyzing if a laptop is indeed an “effect,” the
Ninth Circuit should have considered the possessory interests in Mr. Arnold‟s laptop. The likely
result of such an analysis would be a finding of a protected privacy right; thus, a Fourth
Amendment violation warranting suppression of the information would have occurred.
In a distinguishable unpublished 2002 case, the Washington Court of Appeals opined in
State v. Washington that although police had probable cause to seize a suspect‟s computer, they
did not have the necessary level of suspicion to conduct a search of the computer and the
computer files without a warrant.71 This increased suspicion, or a warrant from a neutral
magistrate, is required in order for police to conduct a search of the computer. 72 During the
lawful arrest of Washington for suspicion of auto theft, the arresting officer was entitled to
search the suspected stolen vehicle and the bag inside. 73 However, the search of the laptop itself
was considered improper because it was conducted without a warrant and no additional evidence
related to the auto theft was being sought. 74 The court thus excluded the evidence by granting
Washington‟s motion to suppress the information obtained during the warrantless search of the
computer and the computer files.75
The important issue is that the officer had no reason to search the files of the computer
because the arrest was for auto theft. The arresting officer had no reasonable articulable
suspicion the laptop was evidence or contained evidence concerning the auto theft. In addition,
the State was incapable of stating a valid case that the files on the laptop‟s hard drive presented

70

Id.
State v. Washington, No. 47773-1-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 142 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 28,
2002).
72
Id. at *3.
73
Id. at *2.
74
Id. at *3.
75
Id.
71

16

safety concerns for the officer. Consequently, the warrant exceptions of search incident to arrest
or exigent circumstances were not established, and thus the search of the computer should have
been preceded by a warrant issued upon an affidavit establishing probable cause.
Due to the sheer volume of data, as well as the highly private nature of the data stored on
and accessed by smartphones and tablets, courts should establish a higher protection that requires
a warrant in order to search smartphones and tablets in addition to laptops. A neutral, third-party
magistrate, issuing a warrant, would be in the best position to determine whether a search of one
of these devices is reasonable. If the officer were to supply the magistrate with an affidavit
detailing the reasons and specifying what should be searched and why, a law enforcement search
would adhere to Fourth Amendment protections of the individual while simultaneously serving
the societal interest of preventing criminal activity.
B. Current State of the Law for GPS and Other Enhanced Surveillance
The use of GPS tracking devices by police introduces novel privacy concerns regarding
nt only when and where the installation of the GPS device takes place, but also how long the data
is transmitted and tracked. In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) agents observed a group of men purchasing unusually large amounts of
fertilizer at a Home Depot.76 Based upon the expertise with narcotics, the agents recognized the
fertilizer as being used in drug cultivation and proceeded to follow the men outside to a vehicle
owned by Juan Pineda-Moreno.77 This was the beginning of surveillance on Pineda-Moreno that
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lasted over a four-month span, including the attachment of multiple GPS surveillance devices
upon the underside of a car owned by Pineda-Moreno on seven separate occasions. 78
The GPS tracking devices were attached not only while the automobile occupied private
space as it was parked within the confines of Pineda-Moreno‟s driveway, but also during night
time hours between 4:00 and 5:00 A.M.79 However, the driveway was open to observation from
the street and was not enclosed by any fence or exclusionary device, nor were any signs posted
prohibiting trespassing or entrance into the driveway. 80 Information gathered by use of the GPS
tracking devices attached to Pineda-Moreno‟s automobile ultimately resulted in agents following
and stopping the vehicle. 81 The stop led to the arrest of all three men inside the vehicle, and
eventually to Pineda-Moreno subsequently consenting to the search of his vehicle and home. 82 In
all, the search produced over two large garbage bags full of marijuana and led to PinedaMoreno‟s conviction.83
In a losing effort, Pineda-Moreno moved to suppress the contested evidence in first
arguing that placing the GPS device on the vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment right to
privacy. 84 He contended that the attachment of the GPS device constituted an “unreasonable
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search” because it violated his subjective expectation of privacy, one which society considers
reasonable.85 Pineda-Moreno was also unsuccessful in arguing that time of day the actions
occurred, the early morning hours in which the agents entered into the driveway, was significant
because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy during those hours in the morning. 86 Lastly,
Pineda-Moreno asserted that the agents‟ continued use of the GPS tracking device to monitor the
automobile‟s location over a four-month period violated his Fourth Amendment rights because
such devices are not typically used by the public at large for surveillance purposes, therefore
violating his right to privacy. 87
In rejecting Pineda-Moreno‟s numerous claims, Judge O‟Scannlain acknowledged that
his automobile was parked within the curtilage of his home at the time the GPS tracking device
in question was attached.88 However, O‟Scannlain downplayed this fact with the argument that
the driveway is only a semi-private area, therefore requiring further actions from Pineda-Moreno
in order to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. 89 According to O‟Scannlain, PinedaMoreno‟s failure to take steps to exclude public access and prohibit the view of his property
invalidated his claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 90
Judge O‟Scannlain employed precedent established in the Ninth Circuit, United States v.
McIver, to quickly dismiss Pineda-Moreno‟s claim that entering the driveway at unusual, earlymorning hours violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. 91 According to McIver, the timing
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of the incident has no constitutional bearing to the legitimacy of the Fourth Amendment
protections. 92 Thus, based on this reasoning it can be inferred that a person has no greater
reasonable expectation of privacy late at night or in the early hours of the morning than a person
would during the daytime or afternoon.
Judge O‟Scannlain again uses McIver to support the conclusion that while the car is
parked on a public street or parking lot, Pineda-Moreno cannot expect privacy and thus it cannot
be considered a search. 93 However, an omission exists in his reasoning – the GPS tracking
devices were applied to the automobile not only in public areas, but also in the driveway, the
curtilage, of Pineda-Moreno‟s home. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the attaching of the GPS
devices in public citing McIver.94 The court‟s rationale was that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding automobiles in public areas. 95 However, no reasoning is given
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to dismiss the unreasonable search claim when the GPS tracking devices were attached while the
automobile was parked in the driveway. It appears that the Court is following the Ninth Circuit
decision set forth in United States v. Magana, holding that the driveway was not private, but
rather semi-private.96 By categorizing the driveway as semi-private, the court followed McIver
and held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy to automobiles parked in the public
arena. Under this logic, it will presumably require that a barrier be established in order to make
the driveway a private area, instead of an area that is considered “semi-private” as in Magana.97
This creates a requirement for people to privatize their driveways in order to be justified in
relying on that area to be afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy. Likely, this would only
be applicable to persons who actually own the home and have enough resources to erect a gate,
garage or alternative type of barrier.
The court also dismissed Pineda-Moreno‟s final argument that a search occurred
whenever law enforcement used the GPS tracking device not readily available to the general
public.98 In support of this argument, the court relied on United States v. Garcia by contending
that following a car on a public street does not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.99 The rationale behind Garcia is that once persons avail themselves to the
public eye, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy. In doing so, the court analogizes the
use of GPS and the information obtained via the GPS to the act of police following a car on a
public road. Following this argument, since the police are able to physically follow and observe
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the car without any technological enhancements, the GPS only enhances the scope of that ability.
In effect, the opinion seems to support the contention that this is a question regarding the scope
of the search, rather than the kind of search performed.
The counter to such reasoning, as raised by Pineda-Moreno and mentioned by the court in
its opinion, is that unwarranted use of tracking devices as a whole constitutes a search and is thus
impermissible without a warrant.100 In Garcia, Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh Circuit and
stated that in the event technology imposes mass surveillance of vehicular movements, the
question would have to be addressed as to what protections, if any, the Fourth Amendment
guarantees the people of this country. 101 If permissible, the protections would clearly be
substantially diminished. Mass surveillance would inevitably have a chilling effect for people in
all areas of life and therefore significantly reduce one‟s reasonable expectation of privacy. This
relates directly back to the heart of the Fourth Amendment for persons to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects.102
C. Future Application by Courts and Future Policy Considerations
The reasonable expectation of privacy may soon come with a price tag. Consider for a
moment the implications of the decision conveyed by the Ninth Circuit in Pineda-Moreno:
“Pineda-Moreno did not take steps to exclude passersby from his driveway, [thus] he cannot
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, regardless of whether a portion of it was located
within the curtilage of his home.” 103 Chief Judge Alex Kozinski openly dissented to the refusal to
reconsider the case and elaborated that the ruling basically protects the people who have the
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ability to protect the zone around their houses with electric gates, fences and booths. 104
Seemingly, the law favors those who are in an economic position to remove themselves from the
public at large. Persons that can afford property with the luxury of self-imposed borders are the
only segments of the population that can withstand the potential new price of privacy. For a
number of Americans, the additional costs of encircling their homes, curtilage, and driveways
with gates, fences, and booths simply is not feasible and is not in line with the original
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
In order to adequately privatize their property, it would require persons to have enough
land in order to erect such barriers, something that can be extremely difficult in cramped, modern
cities. Additionally, it would likely require ownership of the property, subject to various housing
codes and possibly homeowner association guidelines. This is not a realistic solution. With the
numerous practical considerations preventing adequate privatization, this “solution” to making
one‟s driveway a private area would likely be possible for only a select population of Americans.
If this is what the Pineda-Moreno court is suggesting, the better question here is not where
reasonable privacy interests extend to, but how much reasonable privacy interests costs. Is
buying a larger tract of real estate, then erecting a barrier excluding others really the preferred
solution?
Furthermore, a legitimate question as to whether surveillance with GPS tracking on
automobiles constitutes a search has become more pressing. 105 Some critics consider decisions
allowing for GPS tracking devices to be placed on vehicles in driveways and public areas to be
an outright attack on the Fourth Amendment, as well as the reasonable expectation of privacy
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that it affords.106 With recent decisions like Garcia, 107 the Seventh Circuit seems willing to
restrict the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment in order to justify support of law enforcement
actions and allows admission of evidence produced from warrantless searches. 108
Perhaps mass surveillance will result since it appears technology is currently outpacing
law. However, there appears to be a counterbalancing of this trend currently taking place, and
perhaps the scales of justice are balancing after all. 109 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that technology does come with restraints.110 When technology crosses the
boundaries as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,111 then a search is considered to
have occurred, and should be constricted by the rights afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 112
One of the Supreme Court‟s most recent holding regarding government surveillance,
United States v. Jones, was argued on November 8, 2011 and was decided January 23, 2012. 113
In Jones, government agents attached a tracking device to a suspect‟s vehicle, without a warrant,
and followed the vehicle‟s movements nonstop for a month. 114 The issues raised in Jones are
twofold: first, whether the attaching of the device constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth
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Amendment, and, second, does the use of a tracking device to monitor the movements on public
streets violate the Fourth Amendment. In determining that the police‟s actions did indeed
constitute an unreasonable search, the Court clearly articulated that Jones‟ car was an “effect”
per the Fourth Amendment.115 The court did not, however, address whether a seizure occurred. It
nevertheless seems indisputable then, that a person‟s personal technological device would also
be considered an “effect” following this logic. As a result, the same protections should be
afforded smartphones and tablets as well. 116
As a result of Jones, the Supreme Court has reconsidered Pineda-Moreno, vacating the
judgment and granting certiorari. 117 Due to this new holding and the fact that the judgment was
vacated, the Supreme Court is likely to require the Ninth Circuit, whom originally decided
Pineda-Moreno, to apply its analysis of the GPS attachment in Jones to Pineda-Moreno. If so,
then the evidence seized in Pineda-Moreno will likely be excluded due to what will presumably
be declared an unlawful search of Pineda-Moreno‟s property. This is a “win” for those
advocating for full enforcement of the Fourth Amendment and what it stands for today as well as
what it stood for at the time it was initially drafted.
Jones is also important for protecting privacy interests, not just with respect to GPS
attachment onto a vehicle, but to other personal effects of individuals as well. The type of effect
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is not conditioned within the Fourth Amendment; hence, the fact that the item searched is a
vehicle, smartphone, or handheld technological device should have little bearing on the analysis
of whether the effect is searched or not. The warrant requirement, as well as the warrant
exceptions, should be equally applicable as well. Furthermore, if the effect searched does not fall
within an applicable exception, then it is constitutionally protected under the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, the exceptions to the warrant requirement are typically created via statute or
common law, and the legislatures should acknowledge the change in society, advancements in
technology, and desire of the people in a democratic state. It is an opportune time for lawmakers
to act by creating clear legislation on the issue, giving the judiciary modernized rules to apply
when dealing with controversies involving technology. This would cure the problem of courts
relying on outdated rules which are problematical to apply to newer technologies and the types
of data they contain.
IV. Impact
A. Legal Impact
The legal impact of the removing the distinction between technological devices, such as
computers and smartphones, compared to ordinary closed containers would create a bright-line
rule for law enforcement to follow and would also set precedent for lower courts to apply to
subsequent decisions. Considering the advancement in technology over the past decade, it will
become increasingly difficult to draw adequate and consistent distinctions between smartphones
and computers. With the ballooning popularity of tablet computers like the iPad, a tablet
computer that runs on the same operating system as the iPhone, 118 the potential for confusion
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among courts, law enforcement officials, and the public is extremely high. Distinguishing factors
do indeed exist, but the similarities are abundant. That being the case, it would be logical for
courts to consider the two to be the legally analyzed as one in the same and establish precedent
that governs the two identically. Doing so would allow courts to no longer rely on the container
association, in error, with smartphones and would give persons actual notice as to what they can
expect to remain private.
Admittedly, a bright-line distinguishing technology and closed containers would arguably
achieve the same purposes for law enforcement, judicial precedent, and a person‟s actual notice
as well. However, it would still rely on the association of closed containers and smartphones as a
difference of only degree, and not of kind. This has been, and would continue to be, an incorrect
analogy. The two items are distinctly different. The primary reason that smartphones and other
advanced technologies are different than containers is both a difference in breadth and depth of
information accessible. A closed container is limited to the dimensions of the container itself. As
discussed above, there is a finite amount of data, items, and materials that can occupy the
container. Conversely, technological devices both store, as well as access, data from other
locations. This is the key – the information accessed from other sites can create practically an
infinite amount, and kind, of data that can be accessed. 119 Consequently, depending on the
device, and the way the device is used, the information searched and seized by the government is
potentially infinite for all practical purposes. In theory, this extends even beyond the home, and
potentially into every aspect of a person‟s life. Compare this to a container, which is limited to
what is inside that one, specific container. The distinction between finite versus infinite is the
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dispositive factor, and if the Fourth Amendment is interpreted to protect persons, not places, then
this seems to be an appropriate “effect” in which to achieve that purpose.
Second, in consideration of the legal impact of permitting GPS searches, an established
bright-line rule would allow both citizens and the government to understand precisely what
protection, if any, the Fourth Amendment provides them with regards to GPS searches and
information seizures. It would provide effective notice and allow for consistent application of the
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, a clear
rule would eliminate the jurisdictional splits in the Federal Circuit Courts and remove subjective
judicial interpretations of the numerous courts.
Alternatively, these may both be questions that could be solved politically through
legislative action. An act of Congress, passed into law by the president, would produce the same
outcome as a judicially created bright-line rule without causing any issues related to “activist
judges” or separation of powers. Regardless of whether it is the judiciary or legislature that
finally acts, establishing clear guidance is absolutely necessary for coping with America‟s
modern high-tech society.
B. Social Impact
Given the increased reliance on smartphones, 120 it can reasonably be said that a United
States Supreme Court decision, either enhancing or retracting privacy rights with respect to
smartphones, would directly affect a large percentage of the population. As the widespread use
of technology continues to expand, the effects will only increase. A decision patently affirming
Fourth Amendment privacy rights with respect to smartphones and tablets would allow people to
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have a greater feeling of security in their privacy interests, at least with regards to possible
government intrusion of their smartphones and tablets. Conversely, a decision restricting privacy
rights with respect to smartphones and tablets would cause people to have a lessened sense of
security in their property because the government may access their data without their consent.
This in turn may, directly or indirectly, cause persons to use smartphones and tablets in a
different, more restrictive manner. People are likely less likely to store highly sensitive, personal
data in such devices if they believe it will be subject to warrantless searches by the government.
As a result, an extraordinary number of law-abiding, innocent Americans may be unable to use
their device in the intended fashion due to privacy concerns.
The questions concerning the constitutionality of GPS surveillance creates an equally
uneasy feeling of diminished privacy rights. In Pineda-Moreno, the court was unanimous in
affirming the United States District Court‟s denial of defendant‟s motion to suppress evidence
obtained from GPS tracking devices placed on defendant‟s automobile while parked in public
and semi-private areas.121 The social impact here seems to have different effects, including some
based on socioeconomic distinctions. Wealthier persons are more likely to have the ability to
construct barriers, whether that be constructing fences, buying larger parcels of land or simply
utilizing garages. As a result, it appears that, at least from a practical standpoint, lower-income
citizens will not always be afforded the same Fourth Amendment protections as their wealthier
counterparts. If this is indeed the outcome from court decisions, animus feelings from one class
towards the other could be a possible result of the litigation. It is well established throughout the
history of our nation that some of the greatest upheavals and social movements were born from
unequal protection of our citizens. This was exemplified in the Civil Rights Movement of the
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1960s to the current issues regarding same-sex marriage and higher education admissions
discrimination. When decisions are handed down that trigger dissention between societal classes,
the same feelings of inequity that triggered such movements are an inevitable result. In effect,
division amongst distinct groups may lead to social unrest and political pressures, possibly
leading to 14th Amendment Equal Protection issues. Thus, if the United States Supreme Court
affirms Pineda-Moreno, a holding that will likely deny Fourth Amendment protection to many
within lower classes, the resulting outcome may be similar to other historically significant equal
protection issues in American history.
The ultimate legal impact is still in question, as subsequent cases have declined to follow
Pineda-Moreno.122 The balance between personal freedom and autonomy compared against
rights of law enforcement and government personnel has been assessed and considered in
Pineda-Moreno and prior decisions. Pineda-Moreno runs in favor of securing convictions over
the privacy interests of the citizen. However, each of the cases mentioned herein found that
probable cause and or reasonable suspicion was present at the time of the act(s) in question.
Accordingly, courts thus far have eluded the question of what happens when there is no probable
cause initiating the implantation of a GPS tracking device. This question is almost certainly on
the horizon, and when it arrives, what justification will courts rely on?
The holding of Pineda-Moreno will apply pressure on courts and law enforcement to
determine the boundaries of what is considered a “search” under the definition of the Fourth
Amendment. In addition, Pineda-Moreno glaringly seems to imply that in the near future,
warrantless government searches of technological effects will encroach upon areas where many
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citizens believe they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. These potential encroachments
also apply both to one‟s curtilage of the home as well as to a person‟s vehicular movements.
Permitting such actions simply cannot be allowed under the Fourth Amendment.
V. Conclusion
As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski initially pointed out, social elites can still burden the costs
of privacy, but the day may be coming when expansive technological capabilities will become
unlimited. Put another way, it is probable that any steps taken to ensure an individual‟s privacy
will not be sufficient to shield that person from potential technological surveillance. When that
day arises, all citizens will be forced to reconsider the value they place upon privacy and choose
whether or not to fight to protect the privacy rights that are guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment. When this occurs, then perhaps the reasonable expectation of privacy will no
longer be contingent upon socioeconomic factors, but will be free to all persons, regardless of
their income.
Technological advancements provide great advantages in individual freedoms, autonomy,
and simplify some of life‟s everyday burdens. Telephonic communications have progressively
changed from the original telephone, which allowed persons to orally communicate from
different locations, to the cordless phone, allowing persons more autonomy by increased
movement around their home while communicating, to cell phones, which permitted oral
communication almost anywhere in America. Through the last several years, the cell phone has
developed into a device which serves as much, and perhaps even more so, for the transmission of
wireless data as it does for oral communication. With the advent of the smartphone,
communications have largely become a combination of oral communication, text messaging, email communication, and even video phone calls to both computers and other smartphones.
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Personal technological advancements have also expanded from other direction. The first
commonly used computer by the public was the desktop computer. From that point, computers
then expanded and morphed into smaller, faster, lighter, and more mobile laptop computers.
Similarly, laptops have recently evolved into tablets, which are essentially handheld computers
with interactive screens that have virtually every capability of a laptop. As such, it is capable of
e-mail communications, as well as video phone calls both with smartphones and other tablets and
computers. It could be argued that the telephone and computer have merged into the same
device, or at the very least two devices with the same capabilities.
The primary issue is that smartphones and tablets have much greater capabilities than just
communications among persons. Many, if not all smartphones and tablets, have cameras and
storage capacities sufficient to take and store thousands of pictures. In addition, these devices
often store large amounts of data including important personal information, bank account
numbers, social security numbers, names and birth dates of family members and friends,
addresses, potentially privileged attorney-client or spousal communications, detailed web
browsing history, personal e-mails, and other types of personal data. For all practical purposes,
the cellphone and computer have essentially become one, and the Supreme Court should
recognize that privacy concerns with these types of technologies are distinguished, in fact, from
closed containers and finite objects and spaces. The arguments that government officials have
relied upon to validate their search of phones are not sufficient to justify warrantless searches.
The rationale behind the search incident to arrest, as set forth in Chimel v. California,123 is
to protect the officer and to preserve evidence from potential destruction by allowing
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government officials to secure the area immediately surrounding the person being arrested.124
Both concerns, the safety of the officers and preservation of evidence, can be sufficiently
achieved by the confiscation of the smartphone or tablet. There is no justifiable reason that
government officials need to search the smartphone or tablet itself at the time of arrest without a
warrant. If upon further investigation it is determined that the smartphone, tablet, or laptop
should be searched, a warrant can issue without any risk of destruction of evidence or harm to
officers.
The constitutionally of unwarranted governmental use of GPS tracking devices was
addressed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Jones.125 Unfortunately, the
scope of the holding was very limited; a clear, precise rule regarding unwarranted searches via
technological devices remains undetermined. The issue that seems ripe for question, and one that
Jones failed to address, is whether or not the attachment of the GPS device was a seizure.
Whether or not accessing the data transmitted via the GPS device in such a situation constitutes a
seizure thus remains unsettled as well. The Court was able to reach a conclusion without
analyzing that point, but it is inevitable that the subject be addressed in the near future. If the
Supreme Court intends to remain consistent with the concept held that ownership interests
include the right to exclude others from encroaching upon and interfering with property, as
technological devices are considered property, the logical conclusion would be to afford that
protection to such devices under the Fourth Amendment.
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Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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